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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10
11

FLEISCHER STUDIOS, INC.,
Plaintiff,

12

15
16

A.V.E.L.A., INC. d/b/a/ ART &
VINTAGE ENTERTAINMENT LICENSING
AGENCY, ART-NOSTALGIA.COM, INC.,
and X ONE X MOVIE ARCHIVE, INC.,
and LEO VALENCIA,
Defendants.

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

ORDER RE: MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

v.

13
14

CV 06-6229 ABC (MANx)

Pending before the Court are the following Motions: Plaintiff
Fleischer Studios, Inc.’s (“Fleischer”) Motion for Summary Judgment
(docket no. 177), and Defendant A.V.E.L.A., Inc., et al.’s
(“Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no. 175).
parties filed Oppositions and Replies.

The

The Court finds these matters

appropriate for resolution without oral argument and therefore VACATES
the hearing set for November 19, 2012.
Rule 7-15.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78, Local

For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s

Motion and GRANTS Defendants’ Motion.
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1

I.

2

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This matter is before the Court following the Ninth Circuit’s

3

Opinion vacating one ruling in the Court’s June 29, 2009 Order

4

granting summary judgment for Defendants on all of Plaintiff’s claims.

5

See Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 654 F.3d 958 (9th

6

Cir. 2011) (“Fleischer II”), affirming in part and vacating in part

7

Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A. Inc., 772 F. Supp. 2d 1155 (C.D.

8

Cal. 2009).

9

Fleischer II remanded for further proceedings Plaintiff’s claim

10

for trademark infringement relating to the word mark “Betty Boop.”

11

The Court set out a detailed factual background in its December 16,

12

2008 and June 29, 2009 Orders.

13

sketch of the facts, and summarizes the procedural history relevant to

14

the remaining claim.

15

A.

16

Thus, here, the Court provides only a

Factual Overview
This litigation concerns ownership of the intellectual property

17

in the cartoon character Betty Boop.

18

undisputed and are adopted from prior orders and the parties’

19

submissions.

20

The following facts are

Starting in or around 1930, Max Fleischer, then head of Fleischer

21

Studios, Inc. (“Original Fleischer”) developed a number of cartoon

22

films featuring the fictional character Betty Boop.

23

Original Fleischer licensed the Betty Boop image for use in toys,

24

dolls, and other merchandise.

25

her, Original Fleischer sold its rights to the Betty Boop cartoons and

26

to her character.

27
28

For a time,

Approximately ten years after creating

In 1946, Original Fleischer was dissolved.

Max Fleischer’s family attempted to revive the Fleischer cartoon
business in the early 1970s.

The family incorporated a new entity,
2
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1

Fleischer Studios, Inc. (“Fleischer”), with the same name as the first

2

entity and attempted to repurchase the intellectual property rights to

3

the Betty Boop character.

4

and is a distinct legal entity from the long-defunct Original

5

Fleischer that first owned Betty Boop.1

6

owns the intellectual property (copyrights and trademarks) in the

7

Betty Boop character, Fleischer licenses the Betty Boop character for

8

use in toys, dolls, and other merchandise.

9

Fleischer is the Plaintiff in this action

Based on its view that it

Defendants, A.V.E.L.A., Inc., et al., also license Betty Boop

10

merchandise such as posters, dolls, and apparel.

11

merchandise includes or incorporates elements from vintage Betty Boop

12

movie posters that Defendants argue were in the public domain and that

13

they have restored.

14

posters include images of Betty Boop, the words Betty Boop, or both.

15

Defendants’

As relevant here, the elements derived from the

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants’ Betty Boop merchandise is

16

unauthorized and infringes on its rights in the character Betty Boop.

17

Plaintiff therefore pled claims for copyright infringement, trademark

18

infringement, and several related state law claims.

19

B.

20
21

Procedural History
In two Orders, the Court, Judge Cooper presiding, granted summary

judgment for Defendants.

The Court found that Plaintiff held neither

22
1

23
24
25
26
27
28

The Court is troubled by Plaintiff’s casual conflation in its
submissions of itself and the unrelated, long-defunct Original
Fleischer that initially owned the rights in Betty Boop. See, e.g.,
Mot. 5:23-26 (stating, “Fleischer Studios’ association with Betty Boop
began in 1930 when Max Fleischer created a cartoon charater . . .”).
As this Court and the Ninth Circuit have noted, the present Fleischer
Studios is legally unrelated to the original 1930s Fleischer Studios.
Evidently, Plaintiff used this sleight-of-hand in an attempt to
persuade the reader that its legal interest in Betty Boop is of longer
standing than it actually is. The Court was not persuaded or
favorably impressed by this tactic.
3
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1

a valid copyright nor a valid trademark in the Betty Boop cartoon

2

character.

3

29, 2009 (docket no. 105), Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A. Inc.,

4

772 F. Supp. 2d 1155 (C.D. Cal. 2009).

5

claim based on the word mark “Betty Boop”, the Court granted summary

6

judgment for Defendants on three grounds.

7

because of the word mark’s fractured history in which “rights. . .

8

were divided and parceled out to various entities over many decades,”

9

the mark could not indicate a single source, that is, it could not

See Order, Dec. 16, 2008 (docket no. 90); and Order, June

As to Plaintiff’s trademark

First, the Court found that

10

achieve secondary meaning.

11

1171.

12

in the record showed “(b) that any of Defendants’ uses of its poster

13

artwork represent a use of Plaintiff’s word mark in commerce, or (c)

14

that any of defendants’ uses of the word mark are likely to cause

15

consumer confusion.”

16

Fleischer Studios, 772 F. Supp. 2d at

Thus, the mark was not valid.

Id. at 1170.

The Court also held that nothing

Plaintiff appealed.

Initially, the Ninth Circuit upheld Judge Cooper’s orders in

17

their entirety.

18

F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Fleischer I”).

19

based its trademark ruling on the doctrine of aesthetic functionality,

20

a theory that none of the parties raised at the district court and

21

that was not a basis for any of Judge Cooper’s rulings.

22

in Fleischer I, the Court held that Defendant’s uses of the Betty Boop

23

trademarks – both the image mark and word mark – were functional and

24

aesthetic, and were not trademark uses; therefore, Defendants’ use did

25

not infringe Plaintiff’s marks.

26

See Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 636
However, the Ninth Circuit

Specifically,

Plaintiff moved for a rehearing.

The Ninth Circuit then withdrew Fleischer I and issued a new,

27

superceding opinion, Fleischer II, supra.

28

Circuit upheld judgment for Defendants on the copyright claims and on
4

In Fleischer II, the Ninth
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1

the image mark claims, but vacated the ruling on the word mark claims.

2

With respect to the word mark claims, the Court made the following

3

rulings.

4

possesses registered trademarks in the words ‘Betty Boop’”.

5

II, 654 F.3d at 967.

6

ruling that the word mark’s fractured ownership history precluded

7

secondary meaning, finding that that was a triable issue.

8

to the remaining two bases upon which the district court granted

9

summary judgment for Defendants, the Ninth Circuit stated that it was

The Court held that Plaintiff had “submitted proof that it
Fleischer

The Court also reversed the district court’s

Finally, as

10

“unable to ascertain a legal basis for the district court’s”

11

“unexplained” conclusions that Plaintiff failed to show “‘(b) that any

12

of [A.V.E.L.A.’s] uses of its poster artwork represent a use of

13

[Fleischer]’s word mark in commerce, or (c) that any of [A.V.E.L.A.’s]

14

uses of the word mark are likely to cause consumer confusion.’” Id. at

15

968 (citing Fleischer Studios, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 1170).

16

these two bases of the word mark ruling were not explained, the Ninth

17

Circuit concluded “that more is necessary”, “vacate[d] the holding on

18

this issue[,] and remand[ed] to the district court for further

19

proceedings on Fleischer’s trademark infringement claims regarding the

20

Betty Boop word mark.”

21

C.

22

Because

Fleischer II, 654 F.3d at 968.

Current Proceedings
The parties disagree about the scope of the remand: Defendants

23

contend that the sole purpose of the remand is for the court to

24

provide the legal reasoning behind the dismissal of Plaintiff’s word

25

mark claim; Plaintiff contends that, in effect, it has carte blanche

26

to relitigate its word mark claim and present any and all arguments

27

and evidence it has, regardless of whether it presented that material

28
5
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1
2

before or whether the district court previously rejected it.2
The Ninth Circuit did not reverse the district court’s prior

3

ruling, but remanded because the record was incomplete.

4

Fleischer II does not expressly limit the remand to providing the

5

missing reasoning.

6

litigation over this claim entirely, that is, to allow the parties to

7

relitigate the remanded claim anew.

8

Court has some discretion as to what “further proceedings” entails and

9

what arguments and evidence it will consider.

10

However,

Nor does Fleischer II require the Court to re-open

It therefore appears that the

Clearly, the Court cannot revisit any matters ruled upon by the

11

Ninth Circuit.

Thus, for example, Plaintiff’s attempt in its

12

opposition to revive its copyright claims, see Pl.’s Opp’n 12:6-9, is

13

rejected because Fleischer II affirmed the dismissal of those claims.

14

See Fleischer II, 654 F.3d at 965.

15

the Ninth Circuit’s acceptance of Plaintiff’s “proof that it possesses

16

registered trademarks in the words ‘Betty Boop.’” Id. at 967.

17

However, the Court will not consider any arguments that Plaintiff did

18

not present to the district court at the prior proceedings, or that

19

Plaintiff did not pursue on appeal: the Court finds that such matters

20

are waived or abandoned.

21

chains of title that Plaintiff abandoned on appeal.

22

must conduct “further proceedings” on Plaintiff’s trademark claim as

23

to the Betty Boop word mark does not allow Plaintiff to present

24

evidence that was previously properly excluded or to revive abandoned

Similarly, the Court is bound by

This includes, for example, the alternative
That the Court

25
26
27
28

2

The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s exclusion of the
following evidence as untimely: evidence that Plaintiff owned a
federally-registered trademark in the image of Betty Boop, and
evidence that Fleischer’s word mark has achieved incontestible status.
See Fleischer II, 654 F.3d at 965-967.
6
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1

arguments.

2

of its prior determinations or to entertain new arguments or evidence,

3

and Plaintiff has not persuaded the Court that it should.

4

Fleischer II does not require the Court to reconsider any

Based on the foregoing, these proceedings will be limited to a

5

re-examination of the Court’s “unexplained” prior rulings.

This re-

6

examination will be based solely on the evidence previously presented

7

to the district court and preserved on appeal.

8

necessarily limit the Court to mechanically maintaining its prior

9

ruling and simply providing the reasoning that was missing; the Court

This does not

10

could change its ruling.

If the Court changed its ruling, then it

11

would reach the issues of ownership, validity, and unclean hands

12

(among others) that the parties raised in their papers.

13

reviewed the arguments and evidence, the Court maintains its

14

conclusion that Plaintiff’s claims based on the Betty Boop word mark

15

fail because Defendants’ use of the mark is not a trademark use, and

16

because Plaintiff has not shown that likelihood of confusion is a

17

triable issue of fact.

18

other issues the parties raised in their papers.

But, having

As such, the Court will not reach the many

19
20
21

II.

DISCUSSION

Although difficult to ascertain from Plaintiff’s Motion,

22

Plaintiff’s remaining claims are for (a) trademark infringement

23

pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1114, (b) false designation of origin pursuant

24

to 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), (c) state law trademark infringement and

25

unfair competition, and (d) deceptive trade practices under California

26

Business and Professions Code § 17200.

27

Plaintiff’s trademark claims and tag-along state law claims.

28

v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1994) (“This Circuit
7

The same analysis governs
Cleary
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1

has consistently held that state common law claims of unfair

2

competition and actions pursuant to [] § 17200 are ‘substantially

3

congruent’ to claims made under the Lanham Act.”).

4

A.

Legal Standards

5

1.

Summary Judgment

6

As the party asserting trademark and unfair competition claims,

7

Plaintiff has the burden of proof at trial and the initial burden of

8

production at summary judgment.

9

burden with respect to Plaintiff’s claims by “by pointing out that

Defendants may satisfy their initial

10

there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s

11

case.”

12

Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir.

13

2000).

14

party must show that there are genuine issues of fact by pointing to

15

conflicting evidence in the record, or by showing that the evidence

16

the movant cites does not support the movant’s position.

17

Civ. P. 56(c).

18

242, 250 (1986) (citing former Rule 56, which requires non-moving

19

party “to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine

20

issue for trial.”).

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Nissan

If the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving

See Fed. R.

See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

21

2.

Trademark Law

22

Trademarks function as a designation of source or origin. See 15

23

U.S.C. § 1127 (defining “trademark” to include “any word, name,

24

symbol, or device, or any combination thereof – (1) used by a person.

25

. . to identify and distinguish his or her goods. . . from those

26

manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the

27

goods, even if that source is unknown”).

28

Appellate Board has explained:
8

As the Trademark Trial and
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1

The

2

designation in question, as used, will be

3

recognized in and of itself as an indication

4

of origin for this particular product.

5

is, does this component or designation create

6

a commercial impression separate and apart

7

from

8

label?

9

salient

the

other

question

is

material

whether

appearing

on

the

That

the

The Procter & Gamble Company v. Keystone Automotive Warehouse, Inc.,

10

191 U.S.P.Q. 468, 474 (TT&A Bd. 1976) (emphasis added); see also

11

United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918)

12

(“There is no such thing as property in a trademark except as a right

13

appurtenant to an established business or trade in connection with

14

which the mark is employed. . . its function is simply to designate

15

the goods as the product of a particular trader and to protect his

16

good will against the sale of another’s product as his; and it is not

17

the subject of property except in connection with an existing

18

business.”).

19

When, as here, trademark and unfair competition claims under 15

20

U.S.C. § 1114 and 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) are based on the same infringing

21

conduct, courts apply the same analysis to both claims.

22

Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1288 n. 2 (9th Cir.1992).

23

To prove a claim for trademark infringement or unfair competition, a

24

party must establish: (1) ownership of the trademark at issue; (2) use

25

by defendant, in commerce, without authorization, of the plaintiff’s

26

mark; and (3) that defendant’s use of the mark is likely to cause

27

confusion.

28

Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1046 (9th Cir. 1999)

15 U.S.C. § 1114(a).

E. & J. Gallo

See also Brookfield Communications,

9
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1

(“[Plaintiff] must establish that [Defendant] is using a mark

2

confusingly similar to a valid, protectable trademark of

3

Brookfield’s.”).

4

B.

5

Defendants’ Use of the Betty Boop Word Mark is Not Infringing.
Defendants argue that they cannot be liable for trademark

6

infringement because their use of the words Betty Boop is not a

7

trademark use.

8

Summary Judgment Order that Plaintiff did not show that any of

9

Defendants’ artwork represented a use of Plaintiff’s word mark in

This echoes the Court’s finding in its June 2009

10

commerce.

11

conclusion, the Ninth Circuit in Fleischer I did.

12

Circuit withdrew Fleischer I and remanded the case, the reasoning set

13

forth in Fleischer I is nevertheless sound and applicable.

While that order did not provide much reasoning for this
Although the Ninth

14

1.

15

This analysis rests on the aesthetic functionality doctrine

Defendants’ Use of the Mark is Aesthetically Functional.

16

adopted by the Ninth Circuit in International Order of Job’s Daughters

17

v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1980), and clarified in

18

Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062 (9th

19

Cir. 2006).3

20
21

In Job’s Daughters, the defendant jeweler produced rings and pins
that bore a fraternal organization’s trademarked insignia.

The Ninth

22
23
24
25
26
27
28

3

Although the parties did not raise this theory in the prior
district court proceedings, it was put in issue by Fleischer I and the
parties properly briefed and addressed it in the present papers.
Plaintiff stridently contends that the aesthetic functionality
doctrine is not viable in this circuit. Indeed, there appears to be
some confusion applying the doctrine, perhaps stemming from the
semantics of the phrase “aesthetic functionality”. However, it is
clear from Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d
1062 (9th Cir. 2006) that, although the doctrine has limited
application, it is nevertheless viable.
10
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1

Circuit examined whether that use was an actionable “trademark use” or

2

some other kind of use.

3

identification of the maker of the product so as to avoid confusing

4

consumers, it “does not prevent a person from copying so-called

5

‘functional’ features of a product which constitute the actual benefit

6

that the consumer wishes to purchase, as distinguished from an

7

assurance that a particular entity made, sponsored, or endorsed a

8

product.”

9

Because trademark law is concerned only with

Job’s Daughters, 633 F.2d at 917.

To determine whether a use is an “aesthetically functional” use

10

or a trademark use, “a court must closely examine the articles

11

themselves, the defendant’s merchandising practices, and any evidence

12

that consumers have actually inferred a connection between the

13

defendant’s product and the trademark owner.”

14

considering these factors, the Court concluded that although the

15

insignia at issue was in fact trademarked by the organization Job’s

16

Daughters, nothing about the jeweler’s use of the mark would have led

17

a “typical consumer. . . to infer[] from the insignia that the jewelry

18

was produced, sponsored, or endorsed by Job’s Daughters.”

19

Because customers evidently purchased the insignia only for its value

20

as a symbol and not because they believed the organization endorsed

21

the jewelry, the jeweler’s use of the Job’s Daughters mark was

22

functional, and not a potentially infringing trademark use.

23

Id. at 919.

After

Id. at 919.

In Au-Tomotive Gold, the Court discussed the development of the

24

doctrine and set out a two-step test for aesthetic functionality.

25

First, to ascertain “functionality,” the court must ask whether the

26

alleged “significant non-trademark function” of the mark “[is]

27

essential to the use or purpose of the article [or] affects [its] cost

28

or quality.”

Au-Tomotive Gold, 457 F.3d at 1072 (citation omitted).
11
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1

If so, then the feature is functional in the utilitarian sense and

2

cannot trigger liability for infringement.

3

functional and may trigger liability.

4

for aesthetic functionality, one additional question applies: the

5

court should determine if “protection of the feature as a trademark

6

would impose a significant non-reputation-related competitive

7

disadvantage.”

8

does not trigger liability for infringement.

9

Id.

If not, the mark is non-

However, where the claim is one

If so, the mark is aesthetically functional and

While “[t]he concept of an ‘aesthetic’ function that is

10

non-trademark-related has enjoyed only limited application,” it is

11

nevertheless a viable theory.

12

functionality has been limited to product features that serve an

13

aesthetic purpose wholly independent of any source-identifying

14

function.”

15

use somewhat different language to describe the test for aesthetic

16

functionality, the focus of the inquiry turns on whether the use of

17

the mark has a source-identifying or “reputation–related” function.

18

If not, then the use may be “aesthetically functional” and is not a

19

trademark use.

Id.

Id. at 1073.

“In practice, aesthetic

Thus, although Au-Tomotive Gold and Job’s Daughters

20

Consistent with Job’s Daughters, the Court has closely examined

21

Defendants’ products, Defendants’ merchandising practices insofar as

22

they are reflected in the record, and whether there is any evidence

23

that consumers have connected Defendants’ products with Plaintiff.

24

The Court finds, as a matter of law, that Defendants’ use of the Betty

25

Boop word mark is not a trademark use.

26

Defendants use the words Betty Boop as a prominent feature on their

27

product, including t-shirts bearing movie poster images, dolls, and

28

packaging adapted from movie posters.
12

As in Job’s Daughters,

In this regard, the Betty Boop
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1

mark as adapted from the restored Betty Boop posters is a decorative

2

component: it is part and parcel of the aesthetic design of those

3

goods.

4

designated their merchandise as “official” or otherwise indicated

5

sponsorship by Plaintiff; rather, Defendants’ products all identify

6

one of Defendants as their source.

7

the words Betty Boop as an artistic design element and identify

8

themselves as the source of the goods, their use of the words Betty

9

Boop simply cannot be viewed as source-identifying.

As for Defendants’ merchandising practices, Defendants never

Considering that Defendants use

Indeed, Plaintiff

10

has not presented a single instance of a consumer who was misled about

11

the origin or sponsorship of Defendants’ products.

12

These same considerations show that Defendants’ use of the Betty

13

Boop word mark is aesthetically functional within the parlance of Au-

14

Tomotive Gold.

15

mark Betty Boop is not functional in the utilitarian sense because

16

Defendants’ goods would still function the same way without those

17

words: their t-shirts would still be wearable, and their dolls would

18

still be toys were they stripped of the words “Betty Boop.”

19

The Court assumes that Defendants’ use of the word

The Court therefore turns to whether the mark is nevertheless

20

aesthetically functional.

Because, as noted above, Defendants’ use of

21

the mark is a decorative feature of their merchandise and is not

22

source-identifying, “protection of the feature as a trademark would

23

impose a significant non-reputation-related competitive disadvantage”

24

on Defendants.

25

image of Betty Boop or Betty Boop movie posters without the words

26

Betty Boop to identify the character, that would make their products

27

less marketable than the same product that included the BETTY BOOP

28

name.

Were Defendants to market their goods bearing the

This is because the words Betty Boop serve to name the famous
13
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1

character depicted on those goods and are part and parcel of the movie

2

posters printed on Defendants’ merchandise.

3

points to one of Defendants’ dolls that includes packaging bearing

4

imagery from a Betty Boop movie poster, and a product tag that is a

5

miniature reproduction of the movie poster.

6

imagery bear the following text: “Adolph Zukor presents BETTY BOOP

7

with HENRY the Funniest Living American”.

8

p. 17.

9

the textual aspect of the poster reproductions incomplete and the

For example, Plaintiff

Both uses of the poster

See Pl.’s Mot. P. 3, Opp’n

Removing the words BETTY BOOP from these items would render

10

remaining words would be nonsensical.

11

average consumer that such merchandise would be missing something.

12

Clearly, merchandise that is missing something is less marketable and

13

therefore at a competitive disadvantage.

14

Defendants’ use of the Betty Boop word mark is not source identifying

15

and simply does not trade on the “reputation” of any source, barring

16

Defendants from using those words would “impose a significant

17

non-reputation-related competitive disadvantage.”

18

It would be obvious to the

In addition, because

For the foregoing reasons, there is no triable issue of fact as

19

to whether Defendants’ use is a trademark use; instead, as a matter of

20

law, Defendants’ use of the Betty Boop mark is an aesthetically

21

functional use, and not a source-identifying trademark use; such uses

22

are not infringing.

23

2.

Alternatively, Defendants’ Use of the Mark is Fair Use.

24

If Defendants’ use of the mark is not aesthetically functional,

25

then it is “fair use”.

The Lanham Act provides that fair use is a

26

defense to trademark infringement.

27

otherwise than as a mark,. . . of a term [] which is descriptive of

28

and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or

“Fair use” is defined as “the use,

14
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1

services of [the] party.”

2

defense applies when a mark is used in its primary descriptive sense

3

rather than its secondary trademark sense.

4

Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Under the common law

5

classic fair use defense . . . [a] junior user is always entitled to

6

use a descriptive term in good faith in its primary, descriptive sense

7

other than as a trademark.”) (quoting 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY

8

TRADEMARK

9

mark to be considered descriptive it merely needs to refer to a

AND

15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4).

The fair use

See Cairns v. Franklin

UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:45 (4th ed. 2001)).

ON

“For a word or

10

characteristic of the product.”

11

Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d 1055, 1059 (7th Cir. 1995).

12

the maker of cranberry juice could use the words “sweet-tart” in

13

advertising to describe the flavor of its juice over the objection of

14

the owner of SWEETARTS candy.

15

incontestable mark for sugar candy does not make Sunmark the

16

gatekeeper of these words for the whole food industry.”).

17

will address each of the three elements of fair use in turn.

18

Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray
For example,

Id. at 1058 (“That SweeTARTS is an

The court

The purpose of trademarks is to designate source or origin. See

19

15 U.S.C. § 1127.

Thus, whether a use is “otherwise than as a mark”

20

depends on several factors, including “whether the term is used as a

21

‘symbol to attract public attention’ [and] whether the allegedly

22

infringing user undertook ‘precautionary measures such as labeling or

23

other devices designed to minimize the risk that the term will be

24

understood in its trademark sense.’”

25

Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 1040 (9th

26

Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).

27

Boop in connection with their products bearing the image of Betty

28

Boop.

Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v.

Here, Defendants use the phrase Betty

It is extremely unlikely that a prospective consumer would
15
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1

understand those words as identifying the source of the goods rather

2

than merely naming the character.

3

here are not symbols at all, but they comprise the exact name of the

4

character.

5

indicating themselves as the source of their goods.

6

presented no contrary evidence.

7

the words Betty Boop “otherwise than as a mark.”

8
9

Also, the words Betty Boop as used

Defendants also took the precautionary measure of
Defendants have

As a matter of law, Defendants use

Similarly, there is no triable issue of fact as to whether
Defendants are using the words in their primary, descriptive sense.

10

Defendants’ use has “descriptive purity” and there are no “other words

11

available to do the describing.”

12

The words “Betty Boop” used on goods bearing the image of the

13

character Betty Boop self-evidently describe those goods, and are not

14

referring to something else.

15

“impurity” noted in Fortune Dynamic.

16

that Victoria’s Secret’s use of the word “delicious” in connection

17

with its flavored lip gloss was not descriptively pure because it

18

arguably referred not only to the goods (lip gloss), but, according to

19

Victoria’s Secret’s own executives, could also refer to the wearer of

20

the lip gloss.

21

to the goods, but also perhaps to the wearer.

22

imagine what else the words Betty Boop could refer to other than the

23

character depicted on the goods.

24

other than “Betty Boop” available to describe or name the character

25

Betty Boop.

26

established that Defendants may so use the character over Plaintiff’s

27

objection; Defendants must also, therefore, be able to identify this

28

character by name.

Id. at 1041.

Fortune Dynamic, 618 F.2d at 1041.

This contrasts with the descriptive
There, the Ninth Circuit found

Thus, “delicious” did not refer purely
Here, it is hard to

In addition, there are no words

As noted above, these proceedings have already

16
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1

Finally, no jury could conclude that Defendants use the words

2

Betty Boop in bad faith.

This factor is similar to the intent factor

3

in the likelihood of confusion analysis: “whether defendant in

4

adopting its mark intended to capitalize on plaintiff’s good will.”

5

Fortune Dynamic, 618 F.3d at 1043.

6

the mark as a source-identifier and in fact identify themselves as the

7

source of the goods, they did not use the mark intending to capitalize

8

on Plaintiff’s good will.

Because Defendants are not using

9

In short, when any of Defendants’ products are viewed as a whole,

10

it is clear that the phrase Betty Boop describes or identifies by name

11

the character Defendants depict on their products, that is, that this

12

use is “otherwise than as a mark,” descriptive, and not in bad faith.

13

The Court has reviewed all of the examples of Defendants’

14

products presented in the briefs, and nothing about Defendants’ use of

15

the word mark Betty Boop can be considered source-identifying; for the

16

reasons set out above, those uses are, as a matter of law, either

17

aesthetically functional or fair use.

18

word mark fits within the aesthetic functionality doctrine, or,

19

alternatively, is fair use, the ultimate conclusion is the same:

20

Defendants’ use does not indicate a source or origin of the products,

21

and is therefore not a trademark use.

22

infringing, so Plaintiff’s claims fail.

23

D.

Whether Defendants’ use of the

A non-trademark use cannot be

Plaintiff has Not Shown a Triable Fact as to Likelihood of
Confusion.

24
“The test for a likelihood of confusion is whether a ‘reasonably
25
prudent consumer’ in the marketplace is likely to be confused as to
26
the origin of the good or service bearing one of the marks.”
27
Dreamwerks Prod. Grp., Inc. v. SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th
28
17

Case 2:06-cv-06229-ABC-MAN Document 221 Filed 11/14/12 Page 18 of 20 Page ID
#:4896

1

Cir. 1998).

Ordinarily, courts apply the eight-factor Sleekcraft test

2

to determine whether likelihood of confusion is a triable issue of

3

fact.

4

Cir. 1979).

5

Sleekcraft factors here.

6

in the requirement that there be a likelihood of confusion for

7

infringement to occur.”. See, e.g., MCCARTHY

8

23:11.50 (emphasis added).

9

reflects the assumption that the putative infringer’s use is a

See AMF, Inv. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348049 (9th
However, the Court finds it unnecessary to reach the
“A requirement of trademark use is implicit

ON

TRADEMARK, supra, §

Indeed, the Sleekcraft test’s language

10

trademark use.

11

similarity of the marks and the defendant’s intent in using the mark.

12

As discussed above, Defendants’ use of the phrase Betty Boop is not a

13

source-identifying – that is, trademark – use.

14

use of the words Betty Boop does not indicate the origin of the goods,

15

Defendants’ use cannot create the impression that these goods

16

originate with anyone in particular, and cannot therefore create a

17

likelihood of confusion that Defendants’ goods originate from

18

Plaintiff.

19

For example, the factors include the degree of

Because Defendants’

The Court notes Plaintiff’s contention that the doctrine of legal

20

equivalents applies in this case.

This doctrine recognizes that words

21

and pictures that have the same meaning can be confusingly similar.

22

Thus, a word mark can infringe a picture mark if the word mark evokes

23

the picture mark, and a picture mark can infringe a word mark where

24

the picture is a depiction of the word.

25

Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1987) (upholding

26

district court finding that consumers would likely confuse defendant’s

27

word mark PEGASUS with plaintiff’s picture mark of a flying horse).

28

The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board has stated that, “It is
18

See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v.
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1

established that where a mark comprises a representation of an animal

2

or individual and another mark consists of the name of that animal or

3

individual, such designations are to be regarded as legal equivalents

4

in determining likelihood of confusion under the Trademark Act.”

5

Squirrel Brand Co. v. Green Gables Inv. Co., 223 U.S.P.Q. 154

6

(T.T.A.B. 1984) (SQUIRREL and picture of squirrel held equivalent for

7

food products).

8
9

Plaintiff argues that the picture mark Betty Boop is the legal
equivalent of the word mark Betty Boop, and that therefore the Court

10

“should find for purposes of determining a likelihood of confusion,

11

[that] the well-delineated image of Betty Boop is equivalent to

12

Fleischer Studios’ registered BETTY BOOP word marks.” Pl.’s Mot.

13

14:25-28.

14

As the Betty Boop image mark is a representation of the Betty

15

Boop character, and the Betty Boop word mark is that character’s name,

16

it is self-evident that these marks could be considered legal

17

equivalents.

18

Importantly, “the question of confusing similarity does not arise

19

unless the defendant’s use of the picture in question is in a

20

trademark manner.”

21

Ed.).

22

not infringed by the non-trademark use of photographs of the baseball

23

player Babe Ruth.

24

Cir. 1990).

25

But Plaintiff does not show how this helps its case.

3A CALLMANN

ON

UNFAIR COMP., TR. & MONO. § 21:35 (4th

Thus, the Second Circuit found that the word mark Babe Ruth was

See Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579 (2d

Plaintiff has not even argued, let alone shown, that Defendants’

26

use of the Betty Boop image is a trademark use such that it may be

27

deemed the legal equivalent of the Betty Boop word mark.

28

those cases in which “the owner of a word mark received protection
19

For example,

Case 2:06-cv-06229-ABC-MAN Document 221 Filed 11/14/12 Page 20 of 20 Page ID
#:4898

1

against infringing use of a picture mark, or vice versa, involved a

2

true picture mark, a single pictorial representation used repeatedly

3

as an indication of origin.”

4

Boop does not look the same on all of Defendants’ goods, so her image

5

does not appear to be a “true picture mark.”

6

the reasons Defendants’ use of the word mark is not source-

7

identifying, Defendants’ use of the image is not source-identifying,

8

and is not a trademark use.

9

image does not trigger the doctrine of legal equivalents.

10

Pirone, 894 F.2d at 582.

Here, Betty

In addition, for all of

Thus, Defendants’ use of the Betty Boop

Accordingly, the Court concludes that, as a matter of law,

11

Defendants’ non-trademark use of the Betty Boop word mark and image

12

cannot give rise to any likelihood of consumer confusion over the

13

source of Defendants’ goods.

14
15
16

III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court find that, as a matter of

17

law, Defendants are not using the words “Betty Boop” or the image of

18

Betty Boop as a trademark; therefore, Defendants have not infringed

19

Plaintiff’s Betty Boop word mark.

20

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and GRANTS Defendants’ Motion

21

for Summary Judgment.

22

Judgment within ten (10) days of the issuance of this Order.

Accordingly, the Court DENIES

Defendants are ordered to lodge a Proposed

23
IT IS SO ORDERED.
24
DATED: November 14, 2012
25
26

_______________________________
AUDREY B. COLLINS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

27
28
20

